A look at Sandia National Labs’ Threat Analysis Model and why it won’t work

 Today I’ll be taking an in depth look at an integral part of the National SCADA Test Bed -  Sandia’s Threat Analysis model – and its reliance on a flawed OSINT methodology.
Sandia National Labs, in an ongoing effort to protect U.S. critical infrastructure from physical and network attacks, has developed a Threat Analysis Framework comprised of 5 elements:

1. the identification of an adversary
2. the development of generic threat profiles
3. the identification of generic attack paths
4. the discovery of adversary intent
5. the identification of mitigation strategies

Sandia researcher David Duggan and his colleagues, who are responsible for developing this tool, recognized the limitations of classified threat data (i.e., a very slow process to get it to the people who need it) and chose to develop an unclassified threat analysis framework instead. Duggan’s report “Threat Analysis Framework” is available for public release and should be read if you want a full understanding of this model.

http://intelfusion.net/wordpress/2010/02/03/a-look-at-sandia-national-labs-threat-analysis-model/